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Abstract. The deployment of IoT devices is gaining an expanding in-
terest in our daily life. Indeed, IoT networks consist in interconnecting
several smart and resource constrained devices to enable advanced ser-
vices. Security management in IoT is a big challenge as personal data
are shared by a huge number of distributed services and devices. In
this paper, we propose a Cooperative Data Aggregation solution based
on a novel use of Attribute Based signcryption scheme (Coop-DAAB).
Coop-DAAB consists in distributing data signcryption operation between
different participating entities (i.e., IoT devices). Indeed, each IoT device
encrypts and signs in only one step the collected data with respect to a se-
lected sub-predicate of a general access predicate before forwarding to an
aggregating entity. This latter is able to aggregate and decrypt collected
data if a sufficient number of IoT devices cooperates without learning any
personal information about each participating device. Thanks to the use
of an attribute based signcryption scheme, authenticity of data collected
by IoT devices is proved while protecting them from any unauthorized
access.
Keywords: IoT data aggregation · IoT applications · Resource-constrained
devices· Constant size attribute based signcryption
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) applications are deployed in several fields such as
health care, smart cities, smart monitoring [1, 5]. IoT systems connect loosely
defined objects, gateways and services that may exchange data about peoples’
body state, life events, habits, location or professional information. In most of the
cases, this data is sensitive and should be processed and managed with high se-
curity measures. Security management in IoT is a big challenge as sensitive data
are shared by a huge number of distributed services and devices. To face the ex-
ponential growth of data being generated by IoT devices and to efficiently ensure
their collection, aggregation and sharing, fog and cloud computing are usually
used to assist IoT devices since these latters are resource constrained. Although
the usage of these environments has clear benefits, it brought new security and
privacy threats as the data might be outsourced to untrusted environments. To
countermeasure these threats, the data is usually obfuscated before being out-
sourced. In addition, the collected data from different IoT devices is generally
aggregated to considerably save the energy resources and extend the lifetime of
the IoT devices. However, the aggregation affects the security properties that
might be provided by the protection schemes. For instance, the data needs to
be authenticated at the aggregation phase to ensure that it is outsourced from
benign devices while preserving their privacy.
Several works have been proposed to ensure data authentication based on sig-
nature schemes. However, these techniques are usually combined with encryption
to provide data contents’ secrecy. This combination incurs heavy computation
and communication overhead due to the cumulative costs of encryption and sig-
nature. Signcryption [18] has been proposed by Zheng et al. as a cryptographic
mechanism combining signature and encryption in only one phase. Signcryp-
tion allows an entity to encrypt and sign the ciphertext while incurring reduced
computation costs compared to executing the encryption and the signature al-
gorithms separately.
Attribute based signcryption (ABSC) is a signcryption primitive that en-
sures fine grained access control, data origin authenticity and data confiden-
tiality thanks to the combination of attribute based encryption and signature in
one logic step. Similar to other attribute based techniques, ABSC introduces one
main drawback related to high computation and storage costs which depends on
the size of used access policies. To mitigate this limitation, thus, attribute based
signcryption schemes with constant computation costs and ciphertext sizes have
been proposed [2].
Contributions — This paper extends our previous work [4] and it intro-
duces Coop-DAAB, a cooperative privacy preserving attribute based signcryp-
tion mechanism based on the constant-size attribute based signcryption (ABSC)
technique [2]. As such, our Coop-DAAB construction consists on performing the
combined signing and encrypting processes of a set of data devices’ inputs in
a secure collaborative manner. The main idea behind Coop-DAAB relies on the
distribution of the signcrypting operation among different devices, with respect
to selected sub-sets of a general access predicate. That is, each device signcrypts
its input data and sends the partial signcrypted information to an untrusted ag-
gregator. This latter is capable of decrypting the received data only if a sufficient
number of IoT devices cooperates.
Paper organization — section 2 introduces potential applications while
identifying major security requirements. Section 3 introduces the network model
and details Coop-DAAB concrete construction. The security analysis of Coop-
DAAB is discussed in section 4. Finally, performances analysis is detailed in
section 5 and related work is discussed in Section 6 before concluding in section 7.
2 Motivating Applications and Requirements
The deployment of IoT devices is gaining an expanding interest in our daily
life. Indeed, IoT networks consist in interconnecting several smart and resource
constrained devices to enable advanced services. Security management in IoT
is a big challenge as personal data are shared by a huge number of distributed
services and devices. As reducing the amount of transmitted data can effec-
tively save energy, aggregation services are generally applied to derive succinct
contents. This technique can be an alternative that aims at providing security
enhancement while reducing processing and communication overheads in several
applications, namely vehicular networks, mobile crowd sensing and service level
agreement monitoring.
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITSs) — In ITSs, connected cars are
responsible for continuously publishing data related to their location and traffic
status among the network. These broadcasted data need to be genuine in order to
avoid injecting false data in the network. However, ensuring data authentication
should not lead to a privacy leakage of personal data. To fulfill tis trade-off,
collected data should be authenticated using privacy preserving techniques. The
most prominent C-ITS solutions today allows the detection of traffic jam based
on received data from the connected vehicles. Each connected car sends a set
of collected data information, based on embedded sensors, to a central node.
This latter needs to make sure that the received data are authentic. Then, to
decrypt data, the aggregator merges received data from different devices and
decrypts the contents to monitor the state of the road and supply the centralized
infrastructure with necessary information.
Mobile Crowd Sensing — The popularity of increasingly capable human
carried mobile devices such as smartphones and smart-watches involved several
embedded sensors. This led to the appearance of the Mobile Crowd Sensing
(MCS) paradigm. MCS is a sensing paradigm able to outsource collected data by
sensors to a group of participating users, namely (crowd) workers. MCS is mainly
based on the use of mobiles devices and their resources. Thus, data aggregation
can be an efficient technique to ensure data collection while saving costs at the
crowd worker side. Obviously, privacy preservation of the participating entities
and data authentication should be considered in such environment to ensure the
collection of benign data.
SLA Monitoring — Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are widely used to
describe the agreements between customers and service providers regarding the
quality of the provided services [11]. To measure the providers compliance to
the SLA, monitoring tools should be setup to collect specific metrics that can
quantify the Quality of Service (QoS). These monitoring mechanisms should
run continuously or periodically but in either cases can generate huge amounts
of data. Eventually, this data is shared with other components responsible for
performing analysis, reporting and executing SLA enforcement measures. The
amounts of monitoring data can be huge and sending it through the wire can be
an overkill for any system. Moreover, in most of the cases, this data is confidential
and should be processed in a secure manner. Consequently, monitoring modules
can act as an aggregator to reduce the amount of generated data. And to protect
data from any tampering, they should be collected, authenticated and aggregated
before being used by SLA services to estimate the QoS.
As described above, it is clear that designing a secure, privacy preserving and
efficient data aggregation solution, for IoT applications has a high importance.
The proposed scheme must fulfill the following properties:
– data confidentiality – the proposed aggregation mechanism should protect
data contents from being accessed by unauthorized users.
– data origin authenticity – the aggregation scheme needs to ensure that
data are created by authorized entities.
– privacy – the secrecy of devices’ access pattern must be protected. Indeed,
the aggregator must be able to verify data origin authenticity without leaking
extra information about signing devices.
– low computation and storage costs – low processing complexities and
storage costs need to be provided, by the proposed mechanism mainly for
resource-constrained devices.
3 Coop-DAAB: Cooperative Attribute based Data
Aggregation Scheme
In this section, we expose our network model then we present a general overview
of Coop-DAAB. Finally, we detail the different phases of the proposed solution.
3.1 Network Model
Coop-DAAB network model relies on five different actors: an attribute authority,
an administrator, a set of IoT devices {di}{i=1,··· ,M}, a set of gateway aggre-
gating entities {Gwj}{j=1,··· ,L} and a selected IoT trusted node. These different
entities are shown in Figure 1 and defined as follows:
– attribute authority AA – is responsible for bootstrapping the whole sys-
tem in the initialization phase. We assume that AA is a trusted entity. It
also issues certified attributes and related secret keys for the aggregating
gateways and IoT devices.
– administrator admin – is the system administrator responsible for generat-
ing the general access predicates used to encrypt data contents. In addition,
admin generates the signing access predicate submitted to the IoT devices
to sign the collected data.
– aggregating entity (Gw) – is considered as a local network gateway. It is
responsible of collecting, deciphering and verifying the authenticity of data
contents.
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Fig. 1. Network Model
– IoT device (d) – collects, encrypts data then signs ciphertexts before for-
warding to the aggregating entity.
– trusted IoT node (ds) – is a trusted selected IoT device, periodically
assigns to each involved IoT device di a sub-access predicate to be used for
encrypting data.
3.2 Overview
In this paper, we design a new cooperative privacy preserving encryption scheme,
for IoT signed data contents, denoted by Coop-DAAB with constant ciphertext
size. Our proposal relies on the constant size attribute based signcryption pro-
posed by Belguith et al. [2], which has been extended to support collaborative
encryption of a set of data inputs, collected by IoT devices and gathered by an
aggregator with respect to his granted privileges.
Our proposed Coop-DAAB construction involves three phases, namely, Sys Init,
Data SignCrypt and Data Agg.
During the first Sys Init phase, three randomized algorithms are executed.
First, the attribute authority AA performs the stp and keygen algorithms to
generate the global public parameters and derive secret keys associated with
each involved entity’s attributes (i.e., IoT device, gateway). In addition, the
system administrator executes accgen algorithm to generate the general access
signing and enciphering predicates, denoted by Γs and Γe.
The second phase occurs periodically, such that each involved IoT device di has
to signcrypt its collected data content and independently sends the resulting
signcrypted information to the aggregating gateway. Note that the time period
T is specified by the system administrator, during the Sys Init phase. For the
second Data SignCrypt phase, two algorithms are performed, namely enc and
sign, by each involved IoT device. For this purpose, a trusted selected IoT device
(ds) periodically assigns to each involved IoT node a sub-access predicate. That
is, the general enciphering access predicate is split by ds into a set of dummy
and genuine sub-access predicates. Note that a dummy access predicate refers
to an access predicate such that the aggregating gateway Gw does not satisfy
the required threshold (i.e., generally, the aggregator does not have any required
attributes), while for a genuine access predicate, the gateway may have some of
the required attributes. As such, when an IoT device di is assigned a dummy
access predicate, denoted by γd,di , it has to encipher and sign its collected data
content. And, when assigned a genuine access predicate, denoted by γg,di , it
enciphers and signs a neutral group element 1G. Afterwards, each IoT device di
sends the signcrypted result to the aggregating node.
During the Data Agg phase, the aggregating gateway Gw gathers signcrypted
data contents from involved IoT devices. Note that the aggregating gateway
ignores assigned sub-access predicates, and is only aware of the general enci-
phering access predicate Γe, published by the system administrator. During this
phase, four different algorithms are run by the aggregating gateway Gw, namely
vrfchunk, agg, dec and vrfd algorithms. As such, Gw first verifies signed data
chunks based on vrfchunk algorithm. Then, it merges the received signcrypted
results, in order to generate a global ciphertext, based on the agg algorithm,
deciphers the resulting global ciphertext, relying on dec algorithm and checks
the authenticity of the received global data content, based on vrfd algorithm.
3.3 Coop-DAAB Phases
This section details the Coop-DAAB main phases and their algorithms.
3.3.1 Sys Init Phase This first phase includes three randomized algorithms
defined as follows:
– stp — the setup algorithm is executed by the attribute authority AA. The
stp is responsible for generating the public parameters pp and the master
secret key msk while taking as input security parameter ξ. For this purpose,
the trusted authority defines a bilinear setting (eˆ,G1,G2,G, g, h) of prime
order p such that eˆ : G1 × G2 → G, g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2. In addition, It
specifies an encoding function τ such that τ : U→ (Z/pZ)∗, where U is the
attribute universe of cardinal n. The function τ is chosen such that for each
encoded attribute values τ(a) = x are pairwise different.
Then, the stp algorithm selects a set D = {d1, ..., dn−1} consisting of n− 1
pairwise different elements of (Z/pZ)∗ (i.e; dummy users), which must also
be different to the values τ(ai), for all ai ∈ U. Note that for any integer
i lower or equal to n − 1, we denote as Di the set {d1, ..., di}. Finally, the
stp algorithm computes u defined as u = gα·γ and outputs the global public
parameters pp as follows:
pp = {G1,G2,G, eˆ, h, u, {hαγi}{i=0,··· ,2n−1},D, τ, eˆ(gα, h)}
The master key is set to be msk = (g, α, γ) where α, γ are two values ran-
domly selected from (Z/pZ)∗.
– keygen — the attribute authority executes the keygen algorithm once it re-
ceives a key generation request from any participating entity (i.e; IoT device,
aggregating gateway). We denote by E, any participating entity, such that
E ∈ {d,Gw}. The keygen algorithm takes as input the participating en-
tity’s set of attributes, denoted by AE and the master key of the attributes
authority msk and generates the corresponding secret key skE .
For any subset AE ⊂ U of attributes associated with E, keygen picks a
random value rE ∈ (Z/pZ)∗ and derives the secret key as follows:
skE = ({g
rE
γ+τ(a) }a∈AE , {hrEγ
i}i=0,··· ,m−2, h
rE−1
γ )
= (skE1 , skE2 , skE3)
Remark 1. Communication overhead optimization for IoT devices’ key dis-
tribution — Considering resource constraints of IoT devices, in terms of
storage, processing and communications, our Coop-DAAB scheme assumes
that IoT devices are pre-configured with corresponding secret keys. That
is, the IoT device’s manufacturer is responsible for contacting the attribute
authority to physically embed the secret keys into the IoT device.
– accgen — the system administrator runs the accgen algorithm. It takes as
input the attributes universe U and outputs the time period T , the access
signing predicate Γs and the general access enciphering predicate Γe. Recall
that T permits to regulate processing and transmitting signcrypted contents
by IoT devices, periodically. Each access predicate is represented by a set of
attributes S ∈ U and a threshold value t, such that at least t attributes need
to be satisfied by an IoT device to sign or encrypt a data message. In the
following, we denote by Γs = (Ss, ts) the access signing predicate, mainly
used by IoT devices to prove the authenticity of their data contents, and
Γe = (Se, te) the access enciphering predicate, mainly used by the aggregat-
ing gateway to decipher the resulting data contents.
3.3.2 Data SignCrypt phase The second phase occurs periodically, such
that each involved IoT device di has to signcrypt its collected data content and
independently sends the resulting signcrypted information to the aggregating
gateway. Recall that a trusted selected IoT device ds periodically assigns to each
involved IoT node a sub-access predicate. That is, the general enciphering access
predicate Γe is divided into a set of dummy and genuine sub-access predicates
such that:
Γe =
⋃
{{γg,di}i=1,··· ,k, {γd,di}i=k+1,··· ,l}
l represents the number of all participating IoT devices, k is randomly selected
by ds and represents the number of IoT devices that are assigned genuine access
predicates such that they have to encipher and sign a neutral group element 1G,
while the remaining l − k devices are assigned dummy access predicates such
that they encipher and sign their collected data contents 5.
This phase consists of two randomized algorithms, performed by each in-
volved IoT device, detailed hereafter:
– enc — this algorithm takes as input a messagemi and the assigned sub-access
tree γF,di , where F = 0 presents a genuine sub-access predicate and F = 1
denotes a dummy sub-access predicate. It outputs the encrypted message
Cdi . Note that each sub-access predicate is presented as γF,di = (SF , tF ),
where SF is the set of required deciphering attributes by γF,di , |SF | = sF is
the number of attributes of SF and tF is the threshold value w.r.t. γF,di .
First, the device di picks a random κi ∈ (Z/pZ)∗ and computes the enci-
phered message Cdi defined as Cdi = (C1,i, C2,i, C3,i), defined as follows:
C1,i = (g
α·γ)−κi
C2,i = h
κiα·
∏
a∈SF (γ+τ(a))
∏
d∈Dn+tF−1−sF
(γ+d)
C3,i = eˆ(g, h)
α·(κi+mi) · f(mi) = Ki · f(mi)
where f is a bijective and semi-homomorphic function that is specified by
admin (i.e; f depends on the use case), supporting the following property:∏
i f(mi) = f(
∑
imi). For example, f may be the exponential function exp,
where
∏
i exp(mi) = exp(
∑
i(mi)).
– sign — this algorithm is performed by the IoT device di to sign his encrypted
data input, with respect to Γs = (Ss, ts), defined by the system administra-
tor, where Ss ⊂ U is an attribute set of size s = |Ss| such that 1 ≤ ts ≤ |Ss|.
Let Adi be the subset of attribute set related to the signing IoT device where
|Adi ∩ Ss| = ts.
For this purpose, each device di uses his secret key skdi and the aggregate
algorithm aggreg [6] 6 to output a signature σdi . Indeed, di first computes
T1,di such as:
T1,di = aggreg({g
rdi
γ+τ(a) , τ(a)}a∈Adi ) = g
rdi∏
a∈Adi
(γ+τ(a))
Then, di defines the polynomial P(Adi ,Ss)(γ) such as:
P(Adi ,Ss)(γ) =
1
γ
(
∏
a∈Ss∪Dn+ts−1−s\Adi
(γ + τ(a))−B1,di)
Where B1,di =
∏
a∈Ss∪Dn+ts−1−s\Adi τ(a)
5 Assigning sub-access dummy and genuine predicates may be set via activating a flag
F , where F = 0 presents a genuine sub-access predicate and F = 1 denotes a dummy
sub-access predicate
6 Coop-DAAB relies on the aggregate algorithm aggreg introduced by Delerablee et
al. [9].
Afterwards, using the element skdi2 , the signcrypting device di derives B2,di
as follows:
B2,di = h
rdiP(Adi ,Ss)
(γ)/B1,di
In the sequel, di generates the signature σdi = (σ1,i, σ2,i, σ3,i) defined as:
σ1,i = T1,di · g
mi∏
a∈Adi
(γ+τ(a))
σ2,i = skdi3 ·B2,di · h
miP(Adi ,Ss)
(γ)/B1,di
σ3,i = eˆ(g
α, h)mi
Finally, the signcrypting IoT device di outputs the signcryption of the mes-
sage mi as follows:
Σi = (Cdi , σdi , B1,i)
Remark 2. Processing cost optimization for IoT devices’ encryption and signa-
ture algorithms — Considering resource constraints of IoT devices, in terms of
storage and processing, our Coop-DAAB scheme assumes that several elementary
functions (i.e., computation of signcrypted message elements based on public
parameters, such as P(Adi ,Ss)(γ), C2,i
κi
−1
, · · · ) are outsourced to a semi-trusted
device, with sufficient computation capacities [3]. As such, only a few number of
exponentiations and multiplication is required by each single IoT device.
3.3.3 Data Agg phase The Data Agg phase involves four algorithms,
executed by the aggregating gateway Gw, defined as follows:
– vrfchunk — before starting the aggregation process, Gw has to verify that
each received signcrypted message mi has been correctly signed by a related
device di. The vrfchunk algorithm takes as input the set of received sign-
crypted messages {Σi}{i=1,··· ,l} and the public parameters pp. It outputs a
boolean value b ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 means reject and 1 means accept. For this
purpose, the aggregating gateway Gw has to check the following equality:
σ3,i
?
= eˆ(u−1, σ2,i) · eˆ(gα, h)−1 · eˆ(σ
1
B1,i
1,i , h
α·∏a∈Ss∪Dn+ts−1−s (γ+τ(a))) (1)
Note that the aggregating gateway Gw performs the following algorithms
of Data Agg phase relying on correctly signed data contents. That is, Gw
withdraws inaccurate signatures.
– agg — this algorithm takes as input the set of signcrypted data chunks
{Σi}{i∈[1,l]}, where l is the number of participating IoT devices 7. It outputs
an aggregated signcrypted data message Σ w.r.t. a global message M =∑l
i=1(mi), as follows:
7 For ease of presentation, we consider that all received signcrypted contents are cor-
rectly verified.

C1 =
∏l
i=1 C1,i
C2 =
∏l
i=1 C2,i
C3 =
∏l
i=1 C3,i =
∏l
i=1Ki · f(mi)
σ3 =
∏l
i=1 σ3,i
– dec — This algorithm is executed by the aggregating gateway. It takes as
input the aggregated signcrypted message Σ, the set of attributes AGw,
the secret key skGw of the aggregating gateway and the enciphering access
predicate Γe. It outputs the message M , such that M =
∑l
i=1mi. Indeed,
any aggregating gateway Gw having a set of attributes AGw where |AGw ∩
Se| = te can verify and decrypt the signcrypted message under the access
policy Γe = (Se, te). Then, for all a ∈ AGw, Gw has to aggregate its secret
keys related to the required attributes such as:
A2 = aggreg({g
rGw
γ+τ(a) , τ(a)}a∈AGw) = g
rGw∏
a∈AGw (γ+τ(a)) (2)
Afterwards, Gw defines the polynomial PAGw(γ) such as:
PAGw(γ) =
1
γ
(
∏
a∈Se∪Dn+te−1−se\AGw
(γ + τ(a))−BGw)
where BGw =
∏
a∈Se∪Dn+te−1−se\AGw τ(a)
Afterwards,Gw uses the aggregated secret key A2 and the skEGw key element
to compute:
[eˆ(C1, h
rGwPAGw (γ)) · eˆ(A2, C2)]
1
BGw = e(g, h)(
∑l
i=1 κi·α)·rGw
Then, the aggregating gatewayGw deduces the deciphering keyK =
∏l
i=1Ki
such as:
K = eˆ(C1, skGw3) · σ3 · eˆ(g, h)
∑l
i=1 κi·rGw·α
= eˆ(g, h)α·(
∑l
i=1mi+κi)
Finally, the aggregating gateway Gw recovers the message M =
∑l
i=1mi as
follows:
M = f−1(
C3
K
) = f−1(f(
l∑
i=1
mi)) =
l∑
i=1
mi
– vrfd — to verify the authenticity of the signature of the resulting message
M , the gateway Gw uses the retrieved message M and the aggregated σ3.
That is, Gw verifies the correctness of following equality:
σ3
?
= eˆ(gα, h)M (3)
4 Security Discussion
In this section, we analyse the security resistance of the proposed cooperative
aggregation scheme Coop-DAAB with respect to the threat model presented in
section 4.1 while proving the fulfillment of the security challenges defined in
Section 2.
4.1 Threat model
In order to design a relevant aggregation scheme to secure IoT assisted appli-
cations, we define two potential attackers: malicious IoT external device and
honest but curious aggregating gateway, defined as follows:
– honest but curious aggregating gateway – this aggregating gateway is honest
in term of executing the protocols included in our proposed Coop-DAAB
scheme. However, it may be curious about the participating entities sensitive
data.
– malicious IoT device – this IoT device may be an external device trying to
access aggregated data, to forge the signed data contents or to transmit false
inputs. This adversary aims at persuading the gateway that he is a genuine
IoT user.
4.2 Confidentiality
In our proposed Coop-DAAB scheme, data are encrypted before being stored
using an attribute based signcryption scheme. Therefore, the secrecy of data is
inherited from the used ABSC scheme.
Theorem 1. Coop-DAAB ensures the secrecy of both encrypted data chunks and
aggregated data contents.
Sketch of Proof — the proof of Theorem 1 is twofold. First, the secrecy of
signcrypted data contents depends on the security of the signcryption algorithm
used to encrypt data chunks provided by IoT devices. Thus, Coop-DAAB inher-
its the indistinguishability property from [2], such that if a malicious attacker
knows some data about the plaintext, it can not leak information about the
ciphertext. Note that in ABSC schemes, the adversary may try to overcome the
indistinguishability property using his own attributes or by colluding with other
compromised users. Indeed, similar to [2], in Coop-DAAB the users secret keys
are randomised using the rE value which is unique for each participating entity.
This stops the collusion attacks as users can not put their secret keys together
and override their access rights. In addition, sub-access encrypting predicates
used to encrypt data chunks are not communicated to the aggregator Gw. Fur-
thermore, Gw’s attributes do not satisfy sub-access policies used for encrypting
genuine data contents phase thanks to the use of dummy sub-access polices.
Consequently, an aggregator cannot deduce data chunk content.
Second, the secrecy of resulting aggregated contents depends on the consistency
of the aggregating algorithm agg, such that aggregated data contents are only
accessed by the authorized aggregator. Indeed, the general enciphering access
predicate is published by the system administrator to the involved aggregating
entities. As such, thanks to the use of the ABSC scheme, data are only accessed
by users whose attributes match the defined access policy [2].
4.3 Privacy
Theorem 2. Coop-DAAB ensures the privacy property, such that signing at-
tributes are indistinguishable against a curious aggregating entity.
Sketch of Proof — the proof of Theorem 2 states that an aggregating entity
cannot guess which attributes have been used to signcrypt the data chunk. That
is, let us consider a signing IoT device d, holding two different sets of attributes
Ad,1 and Ad,2, that both satisfy a fixed access predicate Γ
∗ = (S∗, t∗). Thus, d
randomly selects a set Ad,b, where b ∈ {1, 2} to sign a data message m, chosen
by a malicious entity. As |Ad,b ∩ S∗| = |Ad,1 ∩ S∗| = |Ad,2 ∩ S∗| = t∗, we deduct
that the two signatures computed with respect to the two set of attributes Ad,1
and Ad,2 have similar distribution. Moreover, the used signcryption scheme [2]
is demonstrated to be privacy preserving in the standard model. That is, while
signing data, the identity of the signcrypting entity and its set of attributes are
kept hidden from any verifying entity. Thus, Coop-DAAB guarantee that the
applied signature does not leak any extra information about the signing entity
neither its signing attributes except what can be already inferred from the used
signing access policy.
4.4 Access Control to Data
Theorem 3. Coop-DAAB provides an access to authenticated data contents.
Sketch of Proof — the resistance of Coop-DAAB against unauthorized access
to data relies on the correctness of the aggregation agg and decryption dec
algorithms, as detailed in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. In addition, the support of
data origin authentication is provided by the correctness of the signing algorithm
sign (c.f., Lemma 3) and its resistance against forgery attacks (c.f., Lemma 4).
Lemma 1. Correctness of the aggregation of data chunks algorithm agg — The
correctness of the aggregation of received signcrypted data chunks is detailed here-
after.
C1 =
∏l
i=1(g
α·γ)−κi
C2 =
∏l
i=1 h
κiα·
∏
a∈SF (γ+τ(a))
∏
d∈Dn+tF−1−sF
(γ+d)
C3 =
∏l
i=1 eˆ(g, h)
α·(κi+mi) · f(mi)
σ3 =
∏l
i=1 eˆ(g
α, h)mi

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σ3 = eˆ(g
α, h)
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Lemma 2. Correctness of the decryption algorithm dec — After aggregating its
secret key relying on Equation 2, the aggregator calculates the decryption key K
by executing the following equations:
eˆ(g, h)
∑l
i=1 κi·rGw·α = (eˆ(C1, hrGwPAGw (γ))) · eˆ(A2, C2))
∏
a∈Se∪Dn+te−1−se\AGw
τ(a)
eˆ(g, h)
∑l
i=1 κi·α = eˆ(C1, h
rGw−1
γ )eˆ(g, h)
∑l
i=1 κi·rGw·α
eˆ(g, σ3) = eˆ(g, h
α·∑li=1mi) = eˆ(g, h)α·∑li=1mi
Finally, the aggregator may decrypt the message as follows:
M = f−1(
C3
eˆ(g, h)α·
∑l
i=1mi · eˆ(g, h)α·∑li=1 κi) )
= f−1(
C3
K
) = f−1(f(
l∑
i=1
mi)) =
l∑
i=1
mi
Lemma 3. Correctness of the signature verification algorithms vrfchunk and
vrfd — First, the correctness of the algorithm vrfchunk relies on the correctness
of Equation 4. In the following, we set the quantitiess = eˆ(u−1, σ2,i)·eˆ(gα, h)−1·
eˆ(σ
1
B1,i
1,i , h
α·∏a∈Ss∪Dn+ts−1−s (γ+τ(a))) and τγ(a) = γ+τ(a). The aggregating entity
has to check if σ3,i is equal to s such as:
s = eˆ(u−1, σ2,i) · eˆ(gα, h)−1 (4)
·eˆ(σ
1
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1,i , h
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Second, the correctness of the signature verification vrfd of the resulting ag-
gregated data is based on the correctness of Equation 3. Such that, the ag-
gregating entity relies on the received message M =
∑l
i=1(mi), to check that
σ3 = eˆ(g
α, h)
∑l
i=1(mi) = eˆ(gα, h)M .
Lemma 4. Unforgeability of the signing algorithm sign — As our Coop-DAAB is
based on [2], it supports the unforgeability property of the signing algorithm, such
that a malicious external device cannot provide a valid signcrypted data message
as it does not satisfy the signing predicate Γs. Indeed, thanks to the randomization
of the secret keys, unauthorized entities can not pool their attributes together
to sign the data chunks. Thus, only authorized devices can generate genuine
signcrypted data chunks.
5 Performance Analysis
In this analysis we compare the computation and the storage overheads of the
closely related attribute based signature schemes. In most ABSC schemes, the
size of a signcrypted data grows along with the size of the encryption access poli-
cies [7, 13]. As Coop-DAAB relies on the constant ciphertext size ABSC scheme
introduced in [2], it presents an efficient aggregation scheme in terms of pro-
cessing and storage overheads. Indeed, as shown by Table 1, our contribution
introduces a ciphertext size which is independent from the size of the used access
policy.
Table 1. Features, Computation and Storage Costs Comparison of ABSC Schemes
Scheme Type Access Policy Key size Signcryption size Signcrypt time Unsigncrypt time
[13] CP-ABE Monotone ls + 2, le + 2 O(ls) +O(le) τp + ET + E1(3 + le + 3ls) τp(3ls + 5) + 2lsET + 2lsE1
[7] CP-ABE Threshold 3le, 2ls O(M) +O(le) +O(ls) E1(2O(M) +mle + 4le + 3 + ls) 2E1 + τp(2t+ 2 + ls) + tET
[16] KP-ABE Monotone m+ ls,m+ le 8 E1(10 + le + 4ls) 6τp + E1(le + 3le)
Coop-DAAB CP-ABE Aggregate-Threshold nE +m+ 1 8 E1(ts + 2) + 2E2 + 2ET E1te + 7τp + 2ET
s denote both the size of the signing policy and the encryption policy. te and ts,
O(M) and m respectively define the encryption threshold, the signing threshold value,
the size of the plaintext message M and the cardinal of the attributes’ universe U .
nE presents the cardinal of the set of attributes of the user. E1, E2, ET represent
exponentiation cost in G1, G2, GT , while τp is the cost of a pairing operation.
Attribute based techniques have been implemented in resources-constrained
devices in several research works [3, 8]. Based on our on going-implementation,
we deduce that in Data SignCrypt phase, the computation overhead raises
linearly with the size of the access signing predicate (ts) (c.f., Figure 3), due
to the execution of aggreg [6] during the sign algorithm. Similarly, dec com-
putation cost grows linearly with the size of the access enciphering predicate
te. The algorithms vrfchunk, agg, enc and vrfd is independent of the sizes of
the encryption and signing access policy. Recall that agg algorithm only involves
multiplications which requires a negligible computation cost compared to pairing
and exponentiation times.
Exponentiation Procedure
Sony Smart Watch 0.03
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Fig. 3. Estimation of Coop-DAAB Computation Costs
The performances of attribute based techniques have been studied in several
research works especially in IoT applications [3,8]. Our ongoing implementation
of the Coop-DAAB’s Proof of Concept (PoC) consists in evaluating the execution
costs of the most known elementary cryptographic functions while performed in
different IoT devices as presented in [3]. To evaluate the performances of Coop-
DAAB, we executed three main cryptographic operations in different types of
IoT devices, namely bilinear maps and exponentiation functions (cf. Figure 2).
Table 2. Selected Devices [3]
Device Type Processor
Sony SmartWatch 3 SWR50 Smart Watch 520 MHz Single-core Cortex-A7
Samsung I9500 Galaxy S4 Smartphone 1.6 GHz Dual-Core Cortex-A15
Jiayu S3 Advanced Smartphone 1.7 GHz Octa-Core 64bit Cortex A53
Intel Edison IoT Development Board 500 MHz Dual-Core Intel AtomTM CPU, 100 Mhz MCU
Raspberry Pi 2 model B IoT Development Board 900 MHz Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A7
6 Related Work
IoT networks consist in interconnecting several smart and resource constrained
devices to enable advanced services. Data aggregation has been widely explored,
yet, few research works have focused on data aggregation in IoT networks while
considering data secrecy and privacy preserving requirements.
Shi et al. [17] have proposed a privacy preserving aggregation technique. In
this scheme, an aggregator is able to collect participants’ data and run statistics
over them without learning private information about each participant.
In [14], the authors design a data aggregation scheme adapted for fog comput-
ing systems. This solution relies on the use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem
to aggregate received data from different parties. This scheme applies one-way
hash chain to ensure data origin authentication. In the same vein, Lyu et al.
proposed PPFA, a Privacy Preserving Fog-enabled Aggregation for smart grid
environments [15]. Their construction relies on fog nodes computation resources
to perform heavy computation-consuming functions. Later, Hu et al. introduced
a privacy preserving data aggregation scheme for IoT applications [10]. The pro-
posed scheme relies on Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) techniques, such
that each device has to first divide sensory data, locally keeps one piece, and
sends the remaining pieces to other group devices. Then each IoT device adds
the received shares and the held piece together to get immediate result. The [10]
construction provides heavy computation and communication costs. Hence, it
makes it unsuitable for resource-constrained devices.
Recently, in 2018, a lightweight aggregation signature scheme for IoT environ-
ments have been proposed in [12]. This scheme is based on the use of a set ho-
momorphic signature scheme to aggregate received signed data from IoT devices
without learning secret keys of each participant. However, data are transmitted
in clear text, between the different involved devices.
Signcryption schemes are generally considered as a logic combination of encryp-
tion and signature schemes that enables a data owner to encrypt and sign data
in one step. This cryptographic technique allows data origin authentication as
the receiver verifies the data owner signature before decrypting. Attribute based
signcryption schemes have been introduced by Gagne´ et al. [7], in 2010. This
first proposed construction combines attribute based encryption and signature
schemes, based on the same access structure. As such, data secrecy and data
origin authentication and flexible fine-grained access control features are pro-
vided. Nevertheless, Gagne´ et al. construction suffers from an important com-
munication overhead that increases dependently with the number of attributes
involved in the access structure. Recently, Belguith et al. introduced a constant-
size threshold attribute based signcryption, referred to as t-ABSC, for cloud
applications [2]. The proposed construction ensures both fine-grained access con-
trol and data origin authentication, thanks to the usage of two different access
policies, assigned respectively to the enciphering and signing process. As such,
users’ privacy and outsourced data confidentiality are ensured. In addition, the
size of signcrypted messages does not depend on the number of attributes in-
volved in the threshold access structure, which makes t-ABSC scheme suitable
for bandwidth-limited applications and resource-constrained devices.
7 Conclusion
Several security and privacy concerns have raised, due to the emergence of Cloud
assisted IoT applications, considered as highly dynamic and distributed environ-
ments. This lead us to design a new cryptographic mechanism to ensure coop-
erative data aggregation for IoT applications while preserving devices’ privacy,
thanks to the attractive properties of attribute based cryptographic techniques.
The proposed Coop-DAAB scheme enables an edge device, i.e., aggregator to col-
lect sensory data from different IoT devices and verify their authenticity using
an attribute based signcryption scheme. The privacy of involved IoT devices is
ensured, thanks to the intrinsic properties of the signing procedure, as it does not
reveal more information other than the accuracy of data integrity verification.
Furthermore, compared to most closely related work, Coop-DAAB is suitable for
resource-constrained devices based on an ongoing implementation of the pro-
posed construction and a detailed theoretical performance analysis w.r.t. com-
putational, communication and storage costs. The analysis clearly shows that
the size of the signcrypted data does not depend on the number of attributes
involved in the threshold access structure.
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